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This want ad discriminates against women.2 Its placement
under the column heading "Help Wanted, Men" indicates to the
reader that only a man is sought for the position.' A woman read-
ing such an advertisement might be discouraged from applying for
the job, even though she might be fully qualified to hold it.4
Although a newspaper classifies want ads as a service to its
readers,5 the system of listing job openings by sex provides no
service at all to a society striving to insure equal employment op-
portunity for both men and women. This comment will explore
the role of the newspaper as publisher of classified, help wanted
advertising that discriminates on the basis of sex. Special atten-
tion will be given to the litigation that has been brought to control
the incidence of this type of discrimination.
Psychological Effects of Discriminatory Ads
The psychological effects on women of help wanted adver-
tisements listed under sexually designated columns has been ex-
1. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 21, 1972, at 30, col. 5.
2. The United States Supreme Court so held, regarding a similar advertise-
ment, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973).
3. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.5 (1974).
4. See Bem & Bern, Sex-Segregated Want Ads: Do They Discourage Female
Job Applicants?, in Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special
Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
2, at 892-94 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bern & Bem].
5. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 393 (1973) (Burger, C.J. dissenting). See also note 126 infra, which repro-
duces a typical notice included by most newspapers in their sex-based help wanted
columns.
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plored in an often cited study" conducted by Drs. Sandra and Da-
ryl Bem at Carnegie-Mellon University. Female test participants
were asked to indicate their willingness to apply for work listed
in both sexually segregated columns and neutral ones. The ex-
amples were actually taken from the Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh's
major daily newspaper. The results of the experiment indicated
that women, indeed, were disinclined to apply for employment ad-
vertised in "Male" columns.7
The courts have also relied on intangible evidence to support
,their findings of Fair Employment Practice (FEP) violations in
want ad formats. In Passaic Daily News v. Blair,' Judge Conford
spoke of the "justifiable lay inference" that job advertisements
placed in "Male" columns discourage many women from applying
for the positions offered. And Justice Powell, writing for the ma-jority in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,"0 spoke of the Pittsburgh Commission's "commonsense
recognition"11 that sex-designated column headings fostered sex
discrimination in employment.
Laws Against Discriminatory Employment Advertising
Because help wanted advertising plays such an important role
in connecting employers with employees, it has received consider-
able legislative attention. Federal law prohibits advertisers from
disseminating employment advertising that discriminates against
women.' 2 In many jurisdictions such advertising is also pro-
scribed by state 3 and local14 statutes. All of these enactments,
6. Bern & Bem, supnva note 4.
7. Id. at 893. The conclusions drawn from such laboratory reenactments of
everyday situations, however, should be evaluated with some caution. Caution is
especially warranted when studies are made with an eye towards litigation, as the
Bern experiment apparently was. See generally Symposium-Law & Social Sci-
ence, 5 VILL. L. REv. 215 (1959).
8. 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973).
9. Id. at 484, 308 A.2d at 654.
10. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
11. Id. at 381 n.7.
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b)
(1970), as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat.
103.
13. ALAS. STAT. § 18.80.220(3) (1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1462(3) (1965); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(d) (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 80-21-6(5) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT., ch. 563, § 31-126(f) (1974); DEL.
POL. REG., art. 47, § 4(d)(ii) (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT., tit. 21, § 378-2(3)(1973); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909(4) (1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7(c)(1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(3) (1973); KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.-
080 (1972); MAINE REV. STAT. § 4572(4) (1972); MD. CODE ANN., art. 49B,§ 19e (1973); MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 151B, § 4(3) (1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.303a(d)(1) (1974); MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subdiv. 1, (4)(b)(1974); Mo. REV. STAT. § 296.020(3) (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1115
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however, address themselves to the advertising activities of em-
ployers, labor unions, or employment agencies; none of them spe-
cifically mentions newspapers or their role in the publication of
sexually preferential advertisements. Moreover, no Fair Employ-
ment Practice (FEP) Act states that the placement of employ-
ment advertisements in columns classified by sex indicates an ille-
gal preference for the gender named in the caption. However,
the courts and the administrative agencies that enforce FEP laws'"
have generally determined that the advertisement and the sex-
based column in which it appears comprise "an integrated com-
mercial statement"' 6 which expresses preference for the sex
named in the caption. Relying on this determination, some
courts 7 and FEP agencies' s have held newspapers liable as acces-
sories to the placement of such advertisements. Since it may be
illegal for the advertiser to direct an employment opportunity to
be placed under a sex-specific column, the newspaper which actu-
ally prints the discriminatory advertisement can be deemed to
have aided and abetted a discriminatory act.
The Newspaper as Target of Litigation
Although Title VII and the related state statutes clearly sub-
ject the sponsors of preferential advertising to liability for causing
their messages to be printed, the publisher has been the chief tar-
get in advertising litigation brought by advocates for working wo-
men. To file complaints against each offending advertiser would
entail an unmanageable multiplicity of suits. If a newspaper could
(1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.340(2) (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 354-
A:8(Il) (1973); N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(c) (1974); N.M. STAT. § 4-33-7(D)
(1974); N.Y. Ex. LAW § 296(1)(d) (McKinney 1972); OHIo REV. CODE
§ 4112.02(E)(4) (1973); 25 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1306 (1973); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 659.030(3) (1973); PUR. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 955(b)(2) (1974); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(D)(4) (1973); S.C., CODE OF LAWS § 1.360.28(2) (1973);
S.D. CoMP. LAWS § 20-13-13 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-6(d) (1973);
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 495(2) (1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180(4)
(1973); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(d)(4) (1974).
14. See, e.g., Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 395, July 7, 1969, amending Ordi-
nance 75, § 8(e), Feb. 28, 1967 (amended Ordinance 75 hereinafter cited as Or-
dinance); New York, N.Y., Administrative Code § B1-7.0(d) (1971).
15. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
4 Pa. Commw. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972); Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J.
474, 308 A.2d 648 (1973); EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1974); Illinois
Sex Discrimination Guidelines § IV(B), BNA FEP MANUAL 451:354 (1971).
16. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 388 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
4 Pa. Commw. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972); Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J.
474, 308 A.2d 648 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Mass. Guidelines on Sex Discrimination in Employment § B(3),
BNA FEP MANUAL 451:573 (1971); Minn. Sex Discrimination Guidelines § 6
(2) (b), BNA FEP MANUAL 451:650 (1971).
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be persuaded to be responsive to the female sector of the labor mar-
ket, however, the incidence of discriminatory advertising could be
greatly reduced. The discontinuation of a newspaper's classifica-
tion of employment opportunities by sex would alone eliminate
scores of FEP violations of the type exemplified above."9 Sexual
want ad discrimination would vanish if the press merely refused
to publish any sexual preferences in its job advertising. 0
THE EARNING POWER OF WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE
The plight of the working woman in America has been well
documented1.2  According to the United States Department of
Labor statistics for the year 1969, women with full-time, permanent
jobs earned only 60.5% as much as men with full-time permanent
work. 2  One out of seven of these women earned less than $3,000
per year, compared to a figure of one in seventeen and one half
for men.23  While 23% of working males grossed between
$10,000 and $15,000 per year, only 4.2% of working females
earned as much.2 4  This last statistic cannot be explained entirely
by major differences in the skill levels between the male and the
female working population, because a woman with five years of
college can expect to earn only two-thirds as much as her male
counterpart.25
The discrepancy between the earning power of men and wo-
men with similar training can be explained partly by Professor
Murphy's observation that:
19. See text accompanying note 1 supra. On the question of advertisers' com-
pliance with the EEOC Guidelines forbidding placement by employers of job or-
ders under sex-titled columns (29 C.F.P.R. § 1604.5 (1974)), one employer has
stated:
It would be more effective to have compliance by the publishers, than
to complain to the contractor. We must compete with firms that do not
comply and we cannot do it successfully by placing ads in a neuter class-
ification.
BNA FEP MANUAL 490:602-03 (1970).
20. Cf. Notice to Advertisers of the Canadian magazine, OILWEEK, reported
in NEw YORKER, Dec. 10, 1973, at 112:
Notice to Advertisers
The Human Rights Code prohibits discrimination because of age, sex,
marital status, race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry, or place of ori-
gin.
In compliance with this Code, Oilweek reserves the right to make the
necessary changes in advertising copy.
21. See, e.g., Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, III,
20 HAST. L.J. 305 (1968); Murphy, Sex Discrimination in Employment-Can
We Legislate a Solution?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 437 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mur-
phy]; Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965); Note, 59 GEo. L.J. 221 (1970).
22. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAcT SHEET ON THE EARNING GAP, at 1 (1971).
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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There is also considerable evidence to show that the gravita-
tion of women towards certain jobs is the result of subtle
mechanisms of social control, such as marriage and tradition.
These social controls tend to channel women into roles which
society finds necessary for continuity and maintenance.
2 6
A help wanted classification scheme that classifies employment op-
portunities into male jobs and female jobs is one of these controls.
It is a significant weapon in the psychological arsenal which so-
ciety utilizes to keep women in an inferior economic position.
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,27 as amended by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,28 proscribes dis-
crimination based on race, religion, color, national origin, or sex
in many phases of private and public employment. The hiring,
upgrading, dismissal, terms of employment, referral for employ-
ment, union membership, apprenticeship, and training of pro-
tected classes are regulated.2 9  The activities of, labor unions,
joint labor-management committees controlling apprenticeship,
employment agencies, and employers with fifteen or more em-
ployees are covered."
The BFOQ and Title VII
Title VII allows sexual preferences in employment when sex
is a bona fide occupational qualification (hereinafter BFOQ) for
the work involved;3 ' the Act does not, however, define a BFOQ.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2 (hereinafter
Commission), exercising its power to issue interpretative guide-
lines on sex discrimination, 3 has set forth its interpretation of a
BFOQ.14 In accordance with state and federal court decisions, 5
the EEOC has interpreted the exception very narrowly. Thus,
a BFOQ may not be based on stereotyped characterizations of the
abilities of the sexes. 6 Moreover, the mere preferences of the
26. Murphy, supra note 21, at 440-41.
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974).
28. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1974).
30. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1974).
32. The EEOC is the administrative agency in charge of enforcing Title VII.
See text accompanying notes 41-48 infra.
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-12(a) (1974).
34. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. So. Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971);
Weeks v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1974).
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employer, customer, or co-workers for a particular sex does notjustify granting a BFOQ for the position.3 7
Many states have protective laws and regulations which limit
the length of time women can work and the physical exertions
that may be required of them.18  This protective legislation would
seem to justify BFOQs for jobs demanding long or arduous work-
ing conditions. Nevertheless, the Commission has found that such
legislation does not take into account the individual capacities of
different women and, accordingly, has ruled in its guidelines that
such laws are superseded by Title VII.39 Only in the situation
where an occupation requires a particular sex for purposes of gen-
uineness or authenticity, such as the position of actor, actress, or
fashion model, do the EEOC Guidelines permit a BFOQ.4 °
Enforcement of Title VII
Title VII is enforced by an administrative body, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.' Complaints under the
statute must first be filed with the Commission.42 If any state
or local agency has concurrent jurisdiction over the activity com-
plained of, the Commission must defer to that agency for sixty
days.4" Should the state or local proceedings fail to satisfy the
complainant, he can return to the Commission. The Commission
then will investigate the allegations in the complaint to determine
whether there is reasonable cause to believe a violation of Title
VII has occurred." Upon a finding of reasonable cause, the
Commission then will attempt to correct the unfair practice
through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion."4 5  If this endeavor fails, the Commission generally will
issue the aggrieved party a "right-to-sue letter,"4 6 which author-
izes the party to litigate in federal court. In the alternative, the
Commission may bring suit itself if the respondent is not a govern-
mental body.47 While the Commission has no enforcement power,
such as the authority to issue cease and desist orders, a federal
court, upon an independent finding of a violation of Title VII, may
37. Id. at § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii).
38. See Chart on Female Protective Laws by State, 3 CCH EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE 20,095.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(1) (1974).
40. Id. § 1604.2(a)(2).
41. 42 U.S.C.A.§ 2000e-4(a) (1974).
42. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
43. Id. § 2000e-5(c).
44. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
47. Id. The United States Attorney General is to bring Title VII suits
against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, Id.
[Vol. 15
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issue injunctions against unlawful practices and order affirmative
relief.4 8
EEOC Guidelines
Title VII authorizes the Commission periodically to issue,
amend or rescind guidelines to insure that the provisions of the Act
are carried out.4 9 These guidelines are important in unfair em-
ployment practice cases because it is a complete defense to a com-
plaint that a challenged act or omission was committed in good
faith reliance on a Commission guideline or opinion.50 In ad-
dition, the guidelines are extremely useful because they serve to
educate courts on the nuances of sex discrimination. Finally, the
guidelines are important in the process of conciliation between the
Commission and a respondent employer. The final conciliation
agreement may incorporate the guidelines and require that the
employer henceforth comply with the standards the guidelines
have established. 51
The original provision of the Commission Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Based on Sex (hereinafter EEOC Guidelines) relat-
ing to employment advertising, allowed the advertiser to place ad-
vertisements under sexually designated columns if (1) the adver-
tisement itself stated that both men and women would be con-
sidered for the job, and (2) the newspaper printed a notice ex-
plaining that its sexual column captions were for the convenience
of readers and that most listings were open to both sexes.1 2 This
guideline was modified in 1966, 51 pursuant to section 713(a) of
Title VII,54 to read in relevant part:
(b) Advertisers covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may
place advertisements for jobs open to both sexes in columns
classified by publishers under "Male" or "Female" headings
to indicate that some occupations are considered more attrac-
tive to persons of one sex than the other. In such cases, the
Commission will consider only the advertising of the covered
employer and not headings used by publishers. 55
Thereafter, the National Organization for Women (NOW) peti-
48. Id. § 2000e-5(g). Subsection 5(g) specifies that such affirmative ac-
tion may include "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
.... " Id.
49. Id. § 2000e-12(a).
50. Id. § 2000e-12(b).
51. See Conciliation Agreement, BNA FEP MANUAL 431:55, 56 (1970).
52. 30 Fed. Reg. 14928 (1965).
53. 31 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1966).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-12(a) (1974) allows the EEOC to "issue, amend,
or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this title."
55. 31 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1966).
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tioned for an amendment 6 to this guideline and, in 1968, section
1604.5 was adopted in its present form:
It is a violation of Title VII for a help-wanted advertisement
to indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrim-
ination based on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification for the particular job involved. The placement
of an advertisement in columns classified by publishers on the
basis of sex, such as columns headed "Male" or "Female,"
will be considered an expression of a preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination based on sex.57
Litigation Pursuant to EEOC Guidelines
Section 1604.5 presented a threat to the press and, as a re-
sult, the American Newspaper Publishing Association (hereinaf-
ter ANPA) initiated a suit in federal district court to challenge
the validity of this guideline. In American Newspaper Publishing
Association v. Alexander,58 ANPA alleged that the Commission
lacked the authority to issue the guideline and sought an injunc-
tion against the enforcement of section 1604.5. The district court
held that no injunction would issue because the guidelines were
not regulations having the force of law, and the Commission
lacked any enforcement powers. 59 The court also found that the
guidelines were not binding on the judiciary and noted that courts
were free to differ on their interpretation.60 Finally, the court
concluded that since voluntary compliance was necessary for Title
VII to be effective, guidelines were important to inform the public
of the Commission's interpretation of the Act.6
It is unclear which side gained (or lost) the most from the
decision in Alexander. Federal court decisions prior to Alexander
had indicated a greater respect for the guidelines. In Udall v.
Tallman, the United States Supreme Court held that "great defer-
ence" would be accorded the interpretation of statutes by the a-
gency charged with their administration. 62 These interpretations
are the
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men
charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in mo-
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.32 (1974) allows any interested persons to petition the
EEOC for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of guidelines.
57. 33 Fed. Reg. 11539 (1968).
58. 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C. 1968).
59. Id. at 1103.
60. Id. The United States Code, however, requires courts to take judicial no-
tice of the guidelines. 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1970).
61. 294 F. Supp. at 1103.
62. 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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tion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while
they are yet untried and new.63
In addition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., concluded that the
EEOC Guidelines were entitled to "considerable weight. '6 4 Thus
it appears that although a court can rule contrary to a Commission
position, as was suggested in Alexander, the courts normally will
accord due consideration to the Commission's interpretation of Ti-
tle VII.
CLASSIFIED ADVERTISING CASES
The reported cases dealing with sex discrimination in the
want ad pages have considered most of the legal issues suggested
by this form of discrimination. The adverse psychological effect
on job seekers confronted by want ads indicating sexual prefer-
ences is well demonstrated in the case of Hailes v. United Air
Lines." The problem of abridging a newspaper's free speech by
enjoining publication of discriminatory advertisements is throughly
explored in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Hu-
man Relations.66 The federal case of Brush v. San Francisco
Publishing Co.67 exemplifies an unfavorable court response to an
attempt to classify a newspaper as an employment agency for pur-
poses of regulation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Want
ad discrimination suits brought in state courts have focused primar-
ily on the newspaper's role as a participant in the dissemination of
discriminatory advertising. As of this writing, the only reported
state cases have emanated from Pennsylvania6 8 and New York,6
with somewhat similar results in each jurisdiction. Although no
litigation based on a newspaper's participation in discriminatory ad-
vertising has been brought in California, the state Attorney Gen-
eral has issued an opinion on the subject that merits discussion.70
Finally, sex-biased advertising controversies have arisen because
of the action of state FEP commissions. 7' We turn now to an
analysis of the cases and controversies spawned by sex discrimina-
63. Id., quoting Power Reactor Co. v. Electrical Union, 367 U.S. 396, 408
(1961).
64. 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
65. 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
67. 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
68. See, e.g., Appeal of the Pittsburgh Press, 3 BNA FEP CAS. 409 (Pa. C.P.
1971).
69. See, e.g., NOW v. State Div. of Human Rts., 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d
867 (1974).
70. .55 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y. GEN. 53 (1972).
71. See, e.g., Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973).
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tion in employment advertising, and to an examination of the rele-
vant legal considerations raised.
Psychological Factors in Classified Advertising Cases
The case of Hailes v. United Air Lines72 illustrates how psy-
chological factors can control the outcome in a sex discrimination
advertising suit. Hailes was a Title VII action brought under sec-
tion 704(b),73 charging the employer, rather than the newspaper,
with illegal preferential advertising. Mr. Clarence Hailes filed a
complaint against United Air Lines for its causing to be published
an advertisement seeking "Stewardesses" in the "Help Wanted-
Female" section of the classified ads. 74 The complainant had re-
sponded to similar advertisements of other airline companies and
had consistently been refused employment. Hailes believed sex
to be the reason for his inability to obtain a job as a steward with
an airline. It was settled law in the Fifth Circuit that the occupa-
tion of flight cabin attendant did not require a BFOQ for women. 5
Hailes therefore claimed that he had been discriminated against
by United's advertisement because its obvious reference to female
cabin attendants deterred him from applying for the job.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.76  The court reasoned that since Hailes
had never applied for the job, he could not have suffered discrim-
ination and thus lacked standing to sue.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Hailes did have standing as an aggrieved person under Title VII.17
The court noted that Hailes could not have applied for the stew-
ardess job because,
the very appearance at an employer's offices of one who had
read the discriminatory ad but nevertheless continued to
seek the job, would demonstrate that the reader was not de-
terred by this unlawful practice and therefore not aggrieved.78
Thus, the gravamen of the complaint was that United had wrong-
fully interfered with Hailes' application for employment. To show
actual deterrence, a complainant needed only to have a "real
present interest in the type of employment advertised."7 9  In ad-
72. 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(b) (1974). See text accompanying note 85 infra.
74. Hailes v. United Airlines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972).
75. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
76. Unreported decision. See Note, 52 B.U.L. REv. 896, 897 (1972).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1974) requires charges to be filed "by or on
behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved."
78. 464 F.2d at 1008.
79. Id.
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dition, the court noted that it was not necessary for Hailes to prove
that he had been turned down by other airlines solely because of
his sex; it sufficed to present,
sufficient evidence of sex discrimination by the other airlines
to inculcate a reasonable belief on his part that applying to
United was a futile gesture.80
In contrast to the Hailes case is a Commission decision 8' in
which a woman filed a complaint against an advertiser who util-
ized the "Help Wanted-Male" column for a job properly open to
both sexes. Since the complainant had no intention of applying
for the opening, she was found to have no real or present interest
in the matter.8 2  Title VII suits thus require a showing of actual
interference with a person's employment opportunities. The Hailes
case demonstrates that such interference need not be physical; it
may operate in subtle, psychological ways to deter job seekers. s3
The Newspaper as an Employment Agency
The crucial provision of Title VII for sexual want ad suits is
section 704(b), dealing with "Other Unlawful Employment Prac-
tices," 84 which reads in relevant part:
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer, labor organization, employment agency, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship ...
to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any
notice or advertisement relating to employment . . . indicat-
ing any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination
based on ... sex ... except ... when... sex ... is a bona
fide occupational qualification for employment.8 5
80. Id. at 1000.
81. EEOC Dec. No. 74-80, 3 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 6421 (1974).
82. Id. 6421 at 4124. However, an organization representing a class pro-
tected by legislation will generally be afforded standing. See, e.g., NOW v. State
Div. of Human Rts., 34 N.Y.2d 416, 419-20, 314 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1974).
83. Cf. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), where the
court held that a newspaper's publication of classified ads offering lodging in a
"white" home could properly be enjoined, even though the advertiser could legally
refuse to rent to non-white tenants because he lived on the premises. See 42
U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1974). The court noted:
Widespread appearance of discriminatory advertisements in public or pri-
vate media may reasonably be thought to have a harmful effect on the
general aim of the Act [Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601
et seq. (1970)]: seeing large numbers of "white only" ads in one part
of a city may deter non-whites from venturing to seek homes there, even
if other dwellings in the same area must be sold or rented on a nondis-
criminatory basis.
459 F.2d at 214.
84. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (1974).
85. Id. § 2000e-3(b) [emphasis added].
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Suits brought under Title VII against newspapers have been based
on the following rationale: the employment advertisements ap-
pearing in sex-based columns do indicate the preference out-
lawed by section 704(b), and the newspapers who publish these
advertisements do so as employment agencies, since, in conform-
ance with the statutory definition of an employment agency,
they regularly undertake to procure employees for an employer. 6
Brush v. San Francisco Publishing Co. The first major chal-
lenge under Title VII against the press' role in discriminatory ad-
vertising was Brush v. San Francisco Printing Co.8 7  In 1969,
Brenda Brush filed a Title VII complaint against the publisher of
the San Francisco Chronicle and the San Francisco Examiner. She
alleged that the publisher violated section 704(b),88 prohibiting
employment agencies from printing sexually preferential advertis-
ing by listing job opportunities under columns designated by sex,
when sex was not a BFOQ for the positions. The plaintiff's cru-
cial contention was that the defendant was an employment agency
since it engaged in disseminating job offerings through its class-
ified ad sections.
The court for the Northern District of California re-
lied heavily on the legislative history of section 704(b) to reject
Brush's theory and to determine that a newspaper was excluded
from the statute's coverage.8" The House Judiciary Committee
report on Title VII had noted that newspapers were not required
under the Act to control, supervise or screen advertisements that
were submitted to them. 90 In addition, an interpretative memo-
randum by Senators Clark and Case had made it clear that the
prohibition against employment agencies, employers, and labor
unions in section 704(b) "does not extend to the newspaper or
other publication printing the ad."'" Furthermore, the court
found that the words "employment agency" do not, in common
parlance, encompass a newspaper. 92
Also discussed in the opinion was the problem newspapers
would encounter were they to be required to screen advertise-
ments to comply with section 704(b). The court noted that such
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(c) (1974) defines employment agency as "any per-
son regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for
an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer."
87. 31.5 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(b) (1974). See text accompanying note 85 su.
pra.
89. 315 F. Supp. at 581-82.
90. Id. at 582.
91. Id., quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (Interpretative Memorandum
of Senators Clark & Case).
92. 315 F. Supp. at 580.
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an obligation would force the classified editor to research every
advertisement requested to be placed under a male heading."
He also would have to determine whether a BFOQ exemption ap-
plied. The court found that such a determination was uniquely
within the purview of a true employment agency, which has the
professional expertise and the opportunity to interview employ-
ers.9 4  In addition, EEOC Guideline section 1604.615 requires
employment agencies to keep records of every BFOQ asserted by
employers and to "keep informed of opinions and decisions of the
EEOC on sex discrimination."9 6 The court concluded that to
place a similar responsibility on the press would be to saddle it
with an unnecessary burden. 7
While the San Francisco Printing Company could be respon-
sible, under California law, for false or misleading advertising, lia-
bility of a publisher for false advertising generally is predicated
on a showing of bad faith.9 8 On the other hand, it could be ar-
gued that a newspaper does not know and cannot reasonably be
expected to ascertain which employment offerings specifying
a sexual preference will violate the law. The Brush court felt that
liability for illegal advertisements properly rested with the spon-
sor.99 Thus, persuasive policy considerations operated in Brush
to shield the press from responsibility for advertising which dis-
criminated against women.
The Progeny of Brush. Suits similar to Brush have been
brought in federal courts against newspapers which print job ad-
vertisements under sexual classifications. The plaintiffs in Green-
field v. Field Enterprises, Inc.10 and Morrow v. Mississippi Pub-
lishers Corp., 0 like the plaintiff in Brush, contended that because
newspapers came within Title VII's definition of employment
agencies, section 704(b) had been violated. These contentions
were rejected in both cases. The determination in Brush that a
newspaper does not constitute an employment agency for pur-
poses of Title VII was deemed controlling. 10 2  It is noteworthy,
93. Id. at 581.
94. Id.
95. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.6 (1974).
96. Id.
97. 315 F. Supp. at 583.
98. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1974) (false advertis-
ing in general); id. § 11022 (false real estate advertising); CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 976 (West 1971) (misleading advertisements on commission salesmen).
99. 315 F. Supp. at 583.
100. 4 BNA FEP CAS. 548 (N.D. IUI. 1972).
101. 5 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DECS. % 8415 (S.D. Miss. 1972).
102. Morrow, however, was remanded on a technicality. The court felt that
the respondent newspaper might be an employment agency for the purpose of Title
VII because the editor determined how advertisements were to be placed. Id. at
7048.
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however, that the courts in both Greenfield and Morrow were
moved to add that the position taken by the plaintiffs in each case
was "an idea whose time has come."'' Although dictum, this
statement is significant in that it reflects the judiciary's (and pre-
sumably society's) progress toward embracing the cause of equal-
ity between the sexes.
The newspaper-as-employment-agency theory also has been
urged in two New York cases. The relevant New York statute
restricts the dissemination of discriminatory employment adver-
tising, but it covers only employers and employment agencies.' 4
The courts in National Organization for Women v. Buffalo Cour-
ier-Express, Inc.'05 and National Organization for Women v. Gan-
nett Co., Inc.1°6 held that the absence of any mention of news-
papers in the FEP law indicated that newspapers were to be ex-
cluded from its coverage; 0 7 neither court found a newspaper to
be an employment agency.
Cases Based on State FEP Laws
State FEP laws parallel many of the provisions of Title VII,
with one important exception: many of them grant the agency
in charge of implementing the law the power to issue cease and
desist orders.10 8  While all FEP commissions stress conciliation
rather than compulsion to combat sex discrimination in employ-
ment, conciliatory efforts by agencies holding cease and desist
powers in reserve are more successful than efforts by agencies
lacking these powers.'0 9 The New Jersey Division on Civil Rights
is authorized to make legally binding rules, 10 and can control the
incidence of employment discrimination by issuing what amounts
to compulsory guidelines."'
103. Greenfield v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 4 BNA FEP CAS. 548, 552 (N.D.
Ill. 1972); Morrow v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 5 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DECS.
8415, at 7048 (S.D. Miss. 1972), quoting Greenfield.
104. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 296(1)(d) (McKinney 1974).
105. 71 Misc. 2d 917, 337 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
106. 40 App. Div. 2d 107, 338 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1972).
107. Id. at 115, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 577; NOW v. Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc.,
71 Misc. 2d at 918, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
108. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.9(12) (1974); N.J.S.A. § 10:5-17
(1974); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw § 297(4)(c) (1972). Accord, National Labor Re-
lations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
109. See J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
113 (1968). See also 1962-63 LOUISVILLE HUMAN REL. COMM'N ANN. REP. 20-
21, 25, 28-29; and BALTIMORE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N 3RD
ANN. REP. ii, 1, 4, 12 (1959) for the experience of two FEP commissions before
and after they gained enforcement powers. In both cases, compliance with the
FEP law rose markedly upon acquisition of the new powers.
110. Law Against Discrimination § 8(d), (g), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-8(d), (g)
(1974).
111. See text accompanying notes 173-74 inf ra.
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Most state FEP laws have advertising provisions similar to
section 704(b) of Title VII. In addition, the state statutes usually
contain an "aiding and abetting" provision.' 12 California's "aiding
and abetting" clause is typical:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice...
(f)For any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the
doing of the acts forbidden under this part, or to attempt to
do so.11
As a result of such clauses, state FEP acts have spawned
cases charging newspapers with aiding and abetting advertisers in
the dissemination of preferential work advertisements. Accord-
ing to the theory behind these cases, the advertisers violate the
provision of the FEP statute controlling the advertising policy of
employers, unions, and employment agencies by causing discrim-
inatory advertising to be published; then by actually publishing the
advertisements the newspapers violate the section proscribing the
aiding of any unlawful employment practice enumerated in the
act. This theory has been tested in the courts of Pennsylvania.14
and New York," 5 and has been the subject of an Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion in California."'
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations
In 1969, the National Organization for Women filed a com-
plaint against Pittsburgh's major newspaper, the Pittsburgh Press,
with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (hereinafter
Pittsburgh Commission). The complaint alleged" 7 that the Pitts-
burgh Press Company's policy of allowing advertisers to place em-
ployment notices in "Male" or "Female" columns, when the jobs
so advertised did not have BFOQs, as unlawful under Pittsburgh
Ordinance No. 75.118 The ordinance was a municipal FEP law,
under which the Commission had the power to issue cease and
desist orders."19
The Pittsburgh Press classified all employment advertise-
ments under columns headed "Jobs-Male Interest," "Jobs-Female
Interest," and "Male-Female Help." The advertiser was allowed
112. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEcutriv LAw § 296(6) (McKinney 1972); PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 43 § 955(c) (1964).
113. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(f) (West 1971).
114. See text accompanying notes 117-34 infra.
115. See text accompanying notes 147-57, 196 infra.
116. See text accompanying notes 159-69 infra.
117. Appeal of the Pittsburgh Press, 3 BNA FEP CAS. 409, 410 (Pa. C.P.
1971).
118. Ordinance, supra note 14.
119. Id. § 13(i).
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to select the desired category. The Pittsburgh Commission found
that the advertiser's placement of job announcements under sex-
based columns violated the advertising provision"' of the ordi-
nance.
The Pittsburgh Commission decided that the Pittsburgh Press
violated the "aiding" clause. 2' of the ordinance by printing the
illegal advertisements. The Press was ordered to discontinue its
unlawful practices and to "utilize a classification system of employ-
ment advertisements with no reference to sex."' 22 Thus the Pitts-
burgh Commission found that the mere maintenance of the dual
classification scheme by the Pittsburgh Press constituted a viola-
tion of the ordinance.
The Pittsburgh Press appealed the order to the Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas. The Press urged various issues of stand-
ing, breadth of the order, and freedom of the press."' The court
held that the Pittsburgh Commission could reasonably have de-
termined that the newspaper had participated in the commission
of an unfair employment practice and rejected all of the defend-
ant's other contentions.' 24
The court also addressed itself to various aspects of the sexu-
ally segregated want ad question. Although the Pittsburgh Press
had printed a disclaimer, 125 stating that no discriminatory intent
was to be inferred from advertising placed under sex-based titles,
the disclaimer was found to be ineffective. 126 In addition, the court
observed that the more attractive jobs appeared in the "Male" col-
umn. 27  Finally, the court found that the Press' classification
120. Section 8(e) is a typical discriminatory advertising ban directed against
employers, unions, and employment agencies.
121. Section 8(j) makes it unlawful to "aid, incite, compel, coerce or partici-
pate in the doing of any [unlawful] act . .. ."
122. Appeal of the Pittsburgh Press, 3 BNA FEP CAS. 409, 410 (Pa. C.P.
1971).
123. For a discussion of the first amendment issue see text accompanying notes
135-46 infra.
124. Appeal of the Pittsburgh Press, 3 BNA FEP CAs. 409 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
125. Underneath the initial appearance of its sex-based column captions the
Pittsburgh Press printed the following:
Notice to Job Seekers
Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the con-
venience of our readers. This is done because most jobs generally appeal
more to persons of one sex than the other. Various laws and ordinances
-local, state and federal, prohibit discrimination in employment because
of sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the
advertisement itself specifies one sex or the other, job seekers should as-
sume that the advertiser will consider applicants of either sex in compli-
ance with the laws against discrimination.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
381 n.7 (1973).
126. 3 BNA FEP CAs. at 414.
127. Id.
[Vol. 15
1974] SEX DISCRIMINATION IN ADVERTISING 199
scheme allowed employers to evade the law against discrimination
by using the newspaper's "Male" column to indicate illegal sex
preferences."'
The Pittsburgh Press appealed this decision to the Pennsyl-
vania Commonwealth Court.' 29 Its main contentions on appeal
were (1) that it had been denied due process of law, since no
specific offense of illegal participation had been proved; (2) that
the use of the column captions was not discriminatory; and (3)
that the Press' first amendment rights had been violated.
130
In affirming"' the lower court, the appellate court compared
sex discrimination to race discrimination. The court reasoned that
since specific, injured parties were not necessary for suits alleging
discriminatory acts against a racial class, the same standard should
apply to sex discrimination cases. 1 2 The court based this conclu-
sion on the premise that sex was, like race, a suspect classification.
Continuing in this egalitarian vein, the court declared asexual help
wanted titles to be a symbol of social commitment to equality be-
tween the sexes.13
3
While the words "aid," "abet," and "participate" were used
interchangeably by the courts reviewing the Pittsburgh Commis-
sion's order, the rationale of the Pennsylvania rule on sex-based
columns appears to depend on the newspaper's participation in
an unfair employment practice. Considering the depressed status
of working women, caused in part by widespread sex discrimina-
tion, and a want ad system that tended to perpetuate that status,
the Pennsylvania courts were willing to confront the Pittsburgh
Press case pragmatically. Thus the deliberate aiding and abetting
of the advertisers' discriminatory purposes were not necessary for
a newspaper to violate the ordinance. Since the Pittsburgh Press
128. Id. at 415.
129. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa.
Commw. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).
130. For a discussion of the first amendment issue see text accompanying notes
135-46 infra.
131. 4 Pa. Commw. at 469, 287 A.2d at 172. The scope of the Pittsburgh
Commission's order, however, was modified to allow advertisers beyond the cover-
age of the ordinance or offering employment requiring a BFOQ to use the sex-
specific columns.
132. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa.
Commw. 448, 464, 287 A.2d 161, 169-70 (1972). For sex as a suspect classifica-
tion, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973); see also Note,
84 HARV. L. REv. 1499, 1506-16 (1971).
133. 4 Pa. Commw. at 463, 287 A.2d at 169. The court also took judicial
notice of the Pennsylvania FEP commission's guidelines (Pa. Bull. No. 24, Vol.
1, p. 707, Dec. 19, 1970), interpreting the state FEP law, similar to Pittsburgh's,
which prohibited advertisers from placing advertisements in columns designated
by sex unless a BFOQ for sex applied. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Commw. 448, 460 n.2, 287 A.2d 161, 168
n.2 (1972).
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was inextricably involved in an advertising scheme held to be il-
legal, it followed that the publisher did "aid, incite, compel, coerce
or participate in" the unlawful practice."'
Freedom of the Press
In practically every case challenging the help wanted format
of the press, a first amendment defense has been raised. 8 '
Newspapers have claimed that restrictions on their want ad poli-
cies interfere with their editorial judgment, in violation of the right
of freedom of the press.136 Additionally, injunctions forbidding
the future publication of certain help wanted advertisements have
been challenged as prior restraints on publication, contrary to the
guarantees of the first amendment.13 7
Alleging infringement of their editorial policy and prior re-
straint, the Pittsburgh Press appealed the decision of the common-
wealth court to the United States Supreme Court. By a 5-4 mar-
gin, the Supreme Court affirmed the state court decision.' Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the majority, found no editorial judgment
involved on the part of the newspaper, because it was the adver-
tiser who determined where his advertisement would appear. 3 9
Consequently, the publication enjoined by the Pittsburgh Com-
mission could be categorized as commercial speech, which tradi-
tionally has been afforded less protection by the Supreme Court. 4 '
134. Ordinance § 8(j), supra note 14.
135. See, e.g., Appeal of the Pittsburgh Press, 3 BNA FEP CAS. 409 (Pa. C.P.
1971); Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973).
136. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n, 7 CCH
EMPL. PRAc. Dacs. 9132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
138. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
139. 413 U.S. at 386.
140. The commercial speech doctrine has been applied periodically in the case
law. In Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), a "green river" ordinance
limiting the door-to-door solicitation of salesmen of magazine subscriptions was
upheld. But see Martin v. City of Struther, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), where an
ordinance prohibiting the ringing of door bells to distribute advertisements for re-
ligious meetings was held violative of the first amendment. Although the free
speech issue was not specifically argued in Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S.
424 (1963), the media was prohibited from carrying illegal optometrist advertise-
ments. The ban on cigarette advertising on the electronic media was upheld in
CBS v. Acting Att'y Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). In another broadcasting case,
New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970), the court refused to strike down a ban on
broadcasts promoting a lottery.
Justice Douglas has criticized the commercial speech doctrine in Cammarano
v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959), and in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971). See also Redish, The First Amendment and
the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo.
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The Court reaffirmed the principle that commercial speech
containing significant elements of protected speech could not be
censored.141  But the Pittsburgh Press situation presented a
stronger case for permitting the suppression of commercial speech,
because:
[a]ny first amendment interest which might be served by ad-
vertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the
regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity
itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental
to a valid limitation on economic activity.142
The Court also rejected the Pittsburgh Press' contention that
the Pittsburgh Commission's order amounted to prior restraint.
14 3
Prior restraint tends to have a chilling effect on the publication
of matter not meant to be restrained, because a publisher may
hesitate to print some "borderline" material for fear that he later
may be judged to have violated the law.144  In the instant case,
however, the Pittsburgh Press knew precisely what category of
copy would violate the ordinance, namely, advertisements the ad-
vertiser was not free to place under sexually captioned want ad
headings. Moreover, the Press would not be liable for printing
such advertisements until the Supreme Court had ruled on the
constitutionality of the Commission's restraint on their publica-
tion.145
Even after the Supreme Court's decision, the Pittsburgh
Press is still left in the predicament of having to determine wheth-
er an advertisement requested for a sexually exclusive column
is exempt from the ordinance. However, a newspaper generally
can ascertain whether such an advertisement is legal. Whether
the employer possesses a certified BFOQ and whether he is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Pittsburgh Ordinance are the determinative
factors in deciding on the propriety of a sex-based advertisement.
The Court in Pittsburgh Press suggested that the publisher could
inquire whether a BFOQ existed, and would be protected if he
relied in good faith on an advertiser's affirmative answer.' 46
Hence, the Press could also determine whether a sponsor of a job
order resided in Pittsburgh or was covered by the ordinance.
WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Con-
text, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191 (1965).
141. 413 U.S. at 384.
142. Id. at 389.
143. Id. at 390.
144. See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
145. 413 U.S. at 390.
146. Id. at 390-91 n.14.
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The New York Experience
The aiding and abetting provision of the New York FEP
law"' received substantially different treatment in the New York
courts. In National Organization for Women v. Buffalo Courier-
Express, Inc., s the newspaper's policy of classifying help wanted
advertising under "male" and "female" columns was attacked on
several grounds, including the "aiding" ground urged in the Pitts-
burgh Press case.' 49  In contrast to the Pennsylvania decisions,
the Supreme Court of Erie County dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. The court emphasized that "thejudicial principles governing criminal liability through accessorial
conduct"' ° would apply to the Courier-Express' alleged aiding.
An accessory to a crime must share the subjective intent of the
principal.' 1  The court reasoned that since the Courier-Express
was ignorant of the details of employment offered in advertise-
ments, it lacked the necessary intent or "community of purpose"
with the employer placing the advertisement.'5 2 The court ap-
parently felt that the duty of determining whether a job properly
could appear under a sexual caption, because of a BFOQ exemp-
tion, rested with the person placing the advertisement.
The aiding theory again was urged in National Organization
for Women v. Gannett Co., Inc.'53 The appellate division of the
New York Supreme Court basically followed the Courier-Express
court's construction of the New York aiding provision. Without
specifically mentioning the criminal accessory analogy employed
in Courier-Express, the court held that to violate the aiding sec-
tion there must be a "knowledgeable and intentional participation
on [the defendant's] part in the unlawful conduct charged."' 54
The Gannett court considered its case distinguishable from
the Pittsburgh Press decision. In the city of Pittsburgh, the Com-
mission had the duty to certify BFO jobs upon request. 5  Thus,
reasoned the Gannett court, the Pittsburgh Press had only to ask
an advertiser whether he possessed a BFOQ certification to deter-
mine the legality of a proposed advertisement. 5 6 In New York,
147. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 296(6) (McKinney 1974).
148. 71 Misc. 2d 917, 918, 337 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
149. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 296(1) (d) (McKinney 1974) proscribes discrim-
inatory employment advertising by employers, labor unions, and employment
agencies. Newspapers are not included in this prohibition.
150. 71 Misc. 2d at 918, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 610-11.
151. See 1 W. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 221, at 297 (1946).
152. 71 Misc. 2d at 918-19, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 610-11.
153. 40 App. Div. 2d 107, 338 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1972).
154. Id. at 116, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
155. Ordinance § 7(d), supra note 14.
156. 40 App. Div. 2d at 116, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
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however, there was no legislative provision whereby the publisher
could determine whether there visted a valid basis for a BFOQ ex-
emption. 157
The California Position
The question of a newspaper's participation in an advertiser's
violation of the California FEP law' recently was considered in
an opinion by the California Attorney General on the "printing
by newspapers of help wanted advertisements in columns segre-
gated by sex."' 59  The Attorney General concluded that in order
to aid and abet' 60 a violation of the state FEP act,' 6' a newspaper
must act with knowledge of the unlawfulness of the discrimination
expressed." 2  Thus he agreed with the pre-1974 New York view
that a criminal law definition of aiding should govern the question
of liability.
The opinion also stated that the question of a newspaper's
actual knowledge would be a question of fact, provable by circum-
stantial evidence. 16' The Attorney General also pointed out that
a newspaper's suggesting or insisting upon the improper place-
ment of employment advertising under sex-based columns might
well amount to an "incitement or coercion"' 6 4 to violate -the law.
Unlike the court in Gannett,165 the California Attorney General
stated that the EEOC Guidelines would be controlling in Califor-
nia, and he reiterated the Guideline's narrow interpretation of the
BFOQ exemption. 166  Consequently, the Attorney General con-
cluded, nearly every advertisement published in a sexually seg-
regated column would violate California's preferential advertising
regulation.' 67
The crime of abetting requires criminal intent on the part
of the abettor. 6  One who innocently aids the commission of a
157. It should be noted that the recent New York Court of Appeals case, NOW
v. State Div. of Human Rts., 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867 (1974), overruled
Courier-Express and Gannett on their conclusions that the newspapers did not aid
and abet FEP violations.
158. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1410 et seq. (West 1971).
159. 55 OPs. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 53 (1972).
160. CAL. LABOR CORR § 1420(f) (West 1971), quoted in text accompanying
note 113 supra.
161. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(d) (West 1971) contains the usual proscrip-
tions against employers' and employment agencies' advertising in a discriminatory
fashion.
162. 55 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 53, 54 (1972).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. NOW v. Gannett Co., 40 App. Div. 2d 107, 115, 338 N.Y.S.2d 570, 578
(1972).
166. 55 OPs. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 53, 55-56 (1972).
167. Id. at 56.
168. 1 W. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 221, at 297 (1946).
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crime is thus protected from criminal prosecution. It could be
argued that one who aids the commission of an unfair employment
practice does not need the protection which the necessity of intent
affords the innocent participant in a crime. Since FEP acts are
remedial rather than punitive, they give both aider and principal
the opportunity voluntarily to comply with commission orders be-
fore any judicial action may be taken. x69 Once a person is alerted
to his unknowing commission of an unlawful employment practice,
he ordinarily can comply thereafter with the requirements of the
statute.
When a person does not know that he is violating a FEP pro-
vision, however, then it seems manifestly unfair to subject him
continually to FEP supervision through orders. Newspaper pub-
lishers claim to be in such a position when they print classified help
wanted advertising under sexual columns. Unversed in the nuan-
ces of the BFOQ, the press might be subject to endless legal pro-
ceedings for having made an unlucky legal guess on the propriety
of placing certain job orders. Newspapers, of course, could volun-
tarily discontinue the hazardous practice of classifying employ-
ment advertisements by sex, especially in light of the fact that
most notices printed under such captions will be illegal because
of the scarcity of ,BFOQ occupations. In fact, as a result of the
United States Supreme Court's affirmance 170 of the Pittsburgh
Press case, virtually every major newspaper in California has dis-
continued its twin job opportunity listings. 17  The single title
"employment opportunities" now generally heads all jobs.
State FEP Commissions
State FEP commissions, the counterparts of the federal EE
OC, are responsible for enforcing state anti-discrimination laws.
California's FEP Commission has been criticized for its allegedly
lax stance on sex discrimination in employment.' In contrast,
the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights (hereinafter New Jersey
Division) has used its power to issue rules having the force of law
to curtail objectionable advertising practices before they become
the subject of litigation. For example, the New Jersey Division
has outlawed sexually segregated help wanted columns. " a In ad-
169. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1421 (West 1971).
170. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
367 (1973) (freedom of the press not abridged by statutory restriction on the pub-
lication of sexually discriminatory advertising).
171. Interview with B.J. Miller, California FEP Commission Conciliator, in
Santa Clara, Jan. 24, 1974.
172. Comment, California's FEPA Remedies for Sex Discrimination-Are
They Working?, 5 U.C.D.L. REv. 483 (1972).
173. See New Jersey Employment Advertising Rules, N.J.A.C. § 13:11-1.3
(1972).
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dition, the New Jersey Employment Advertising Rules, promul-
gated by the Division, hold the newspaper responsible for publish-
ing any advertising that specifies a particular sex within the adver-
tisement, unless a BFOQ applies.' 74 The press responded to the
Division's strong stand against newspaper participation in sex dis-
crimination in Passaic Daily News v. Blair.175
Passaic Daily News v. Blair
The Passaic Daily News challenged the promulgation of the
New Jersey Rules, claiming that they constituted an incorrect in-
terpretation of the state anti-discrimination law.176  The Daily
News sought a declaratory judgment in the New Jersey Supreme
Court that its sex-based help wanted format was legal under exist-
ing law. It contended that New Jersey Statute section 10:5-12
(c), 177 which prohibits the expression of discriminatory intent in
job advertising, was limited in its coverage to employers, unions,
and employment agencies. Furthermore, the Daily News argued
that because of the unpredictability of the BFOQ factor, the Rules
placed an unreasonable burden on newspapers to determine when
an advertisement could legally indicate sexual preference. 178  The
issue to be decided was whether the New Jersey Division had ex-
ceeded the scope of its authority in promulgating such far-reaching
rules.
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously approved the
adoption of the Advertising Rules. 179  The court ruled that the
remedial powers of the New Jersey Division were to be liberally
construed in view of the preeminent social significance of its pur-
poses.18 Furthermore, explained the court, an agency in charge
of administering a law is entitled to considerable deference.'
In discussing the harmful effect of separate newspaper classifica-
tions for male and female jobs, the court noted that the mere exis-
tence of sex-based columns for BFOQ jobs actually encourages the
discrimination which the Division was attempting to prevent: the
availability of sex-specifying headings enables the advertiser to
circulate his discriminatory intent at little risk to himself.'82 The
columns thus served both to "encourage" and to "facilitate" dis-
174. N.J.A.C. § 13:11-1.4(a) (1972).
175. 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973).
176. N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 etseq. (1972).
177. Id. § 10:5-12(c).
178. 63 N.J. at 479, 308 A.2d at 651.
179. Id. at 493, 308 A.2d at 659.
180. Id. at 484, 308 A.2d at 654.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 487, 308 A.2d at 65b.
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
crimination.'8 3
The court also found little merit in the Daily News' conten-
tion that it was too burdensome to screen individual advertise-
ments for illegal expressions. The Division's rules clearly spelled
out what sexual preferences were permissible.' 84 The court noted
that genuine BFOQs were rare; thus, the screening of individual ad-
vertisements would result in minimal inconvenience to the Daily
News and, in any case, such inconvenience should be borne by the
newspaper in the interest of public policy.' 8" Since the rules also re-
quired a newspaper to ask for the identification number given by
the Division to any BFOQ claimed by an advertiser, a publisher
relying in good faith on such a number would not be in violation
of the Rules. Finally, the court observed that, with a little exper-
ience, the Daily News' advertising editor would have no trouble
screening submissions.186  The New Jersey Supreme Court thus
approved of the strong position taken by the state FEP commis-
sion.' s7
Connecticut and New York Commission Decisions
State FEP commissions can also advance the cause of equal
employment opportunity for women in their enforcement proceed-
ings. The case of Connecticut Commission on Human Rights v.
The Evening Sentinel18 8 provides an example of a forceful stand
against sex bias taken by the Connecticut Commission, which is
authorized to issue cease and desist orders to enforce the state
FEP act. 8 The Evening Sentinel, a Connecticut newspaper, had
a policy under which the advertiser was permitted to place em-
ployment advertisements in either "Male" or "Female" columns.
When a complaint regarding this practice was filed with the Com-
mission, the Sentinel asked the agency for guidelines on the pro-
per placement of advertisements in sex-based columns. The
Commission declined this request, however, declaring only that
the practice of using segregated columns must cease. 90
The conservative influence a FEP agency can have on sex
discrimination, as manifested by newspaper help wanted formats,
can be observed in the operation of the New York Division of
183. Id. at 488, 308 A.2d at 656.
184. Id. at 492-93, 308 A.2d at 658.
185. Id. at 493, 308 A.2d at 659.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 5073 (1972).
189. CoNN. GEN. STAT., ch. 563 § 31-127 (1974).
190. 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 5073 at 3151 (1972).
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Human Rights prior to 1973.191 In 1971, the National Organ-
ization for Women filed a complaint with the Division charging
the Gannett Company, operator of two New York newspapers,
with maintaining separate classifications for male and female em-
ployment openings. The Division ruled that the mere main-
tenance of the dual classification scheme did not establish Gan-
nett's participation in illegal discrimination, since there was no
proof that Gannett knew the jobs did not require BFOs.19' The
Division's guidelines'9 3 on sex discrimination specifically allowed
the use of the dual column format for employment advertising if
a disclaimer, similar to the one used by The Pittsburgh Press,'94
appeared in the classified section. Since Gannett's newspapers
printed such a disclaimer, the Division dismissed the action. The
administrative remedy having been exhausted, the action there-
after was pursued in state court, where the Division was upheld.19 5
CONCLUSION
It is probable that no FEP statute has been enacted with the
intention of controlling the publication of sexist advertisements by
newspapers. However, a substantial body of law has arisen from
the FEP laws with respect to the role of the press in sex-biased
advertising. While the courts are the final arbiters of what em-
ployment advertising practices are unlawful, the administrative ag-
encies in charge of enforcing FEP laws have the greatest influence
on the incidence and scope of occupational discrimination in the
want ad pages. Through guidelines, rules, and opinion letters,
FEP commissions define the parameters of permissible sexual spe-
cification appearing in the printed media.
The New York Court of Appeals recently addressed itself
to the issue of sexually designated want ad columns. Without
mentioning the Courier-Express and Gannett cases or their ration-
ales, the court held, in National Organization for Women v.
State Division on Human Rights,'96 that the publication of sex-
based columns aided and abetted sex discrimination. No author-
ity was cited for this conclusion and no supportive reasoning was
191. In 1973, the Division issued guidelines restricting newspapers from print-
ing jobs in sex-based columns except on proof of a BFOQ exemption. SrATE
DIv. HUM. RGTs. L. BULL. No. 322 (1973).
192. NOW v. State Div. of Human Rights, 5 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DECS. 8457
(N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
193. 1972 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 26,053.
194. See note 125 supra.
195. NOW v. Gannett Co., 40 App. Div. 2d 107, 338 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1972);
see text accompanying notes 153-159 supra.
196. 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867 (1974).
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offered. It was as if the court found the resolution of the matter
before it so obvious as to require no discussion.
In California, although employment columns designated by
sex have virtually disappeared since Pittsburgh Press, unlawful
specifications of sex still regularly occur in the body of help wan-
ted advertisements. According to the California Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion,' 97 a newspaper is not responsible for sexual pref-
ferences appearing in individual advertisements unless it knows
that such preferences are improper. The California FEP Com-
mission, on the other hand, has informed state newspapers that
it considers the publisher to be in possible violation of the FEP
Act for publishing individual employment advertisements specify-
ing sex.' 98
The issue in discriminatory want ad litigation has thus moved
from column titles to the content of single advertisements. Prob-
ably the strongest position a state FEP commission can now take
against single advertisement sex discrimination is to issue a guide-
line holding a newspaper responsible for such notices and to liti-
gate violations.' 9 Counsel for the press can no doubt present
technical legal arguments why the additional burden of screening
individual advertisements should not be imposed on newspapers.
Hopefully, though the recent New York Court of Appeals de-
cision in NOW v. State Division presages a general willingness of
courts to cut the Gordian knot of nice legal questions and hold
outright that practices which further sex discrimination in employ-
ment must be eliminated. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Passaic Daily News v. Blair,20 has already shown the
way.
Few newspapers would print in their classified pages job no-
tices that indicated racial preferences. Nevertheless, most news-
papers are willing to print FEP advertising violations when sex
discrimination is involved. The unlikelihood of enforcement of
these violations is insured by the difficulty in ascertaining which
advertisements, specifying sex are illegal. Yet the press is aware
by now that many of its job notices will be discriminatory.
Clearly, an additional problem facing advocates for working wo-
men is the apparent lack of commitment the press has shown to-
wards insuring equal employment opportunity for women.
Of course, combatting sex discrimination in employment ad-
197. 55 OPS. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 53 (1972).
198. Letter from the California FEP Commission to various newspaper pub-
lishers, Oct. 11, 1973, on file at the Santa Clara Lawyer.
199. See, e.g., Iowa Rules on Sex-Segregated Want Ads, § 1.1(1), (2), 451
BNA FEP MANUAL 451:407 (1970).
200. Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973).
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vertising is only the first step for the female worker. Discrimina-
tion in hiring and advancement still occurs in spite of advertising
notices proclaiming that the employer is an equal opportunity em-
ployer. Nevertheless, the struggle to rid the want ad pages of
their blatantly sexist character has helped to remove the prelimin-
ary obstacle female job seekers have faced. Inevitably, as more
women apply for positions formerly considered "male only," more
will be accepted. And, to be sure, more women will respond to
job advertisements which place no limitations, express or implied,
on female applicants.
Peter W. Kerman
